Examen forense de evidencia digital

Title: Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement
Series: N/A
Author: National Institute of Justice
Published: April 2004
Subject: Cyber/electronic crime
92 pages
120 Kbytes
—————————
Figures, charts, forms, and tables are not included in this ASCII plain-text file.
To view this document in its entirety, download the Adobe Acrobat graphic file
available from this Web site or order a print copy from NCJRS at 800-851-
3420 (877-712-9279 For TTY users).
—————————
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice
NIJ Special Report
Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement
—————————
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
John Ashcroft
Attorney General
Deborah J. Daniels
Assistant Attorney General
Sarah V. Hart
Director, National Institute of Justice
This and other publications and products of the U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice can be found on the
World Wide Web at the following site:
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice
https://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
—————————
APR. 04
Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement
NCJ 199408
—————————
NIJ
Sarah V. Hart
Director
This document is not intended to create, does not create, and may not be relied
upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party in any matter civil or criminal.
Opinions or points of view expressed in this document represent a consensus of
the authors and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice. The products, manufacturers, and organizations
discussed in this document are presented for informational purposes only and
do not constitute product approval or endorsement by the U.S. Department of Justice.
This document was prepared under Interagency Agreement #1999-IJ-R-094
between the National Institute of Justice and the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Office of Law Enforcement Standards.
The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and
the Office for Victims of Crime.
—————————
Foreword
Developments in the world have shown how simple it is to acquire all sorts of
information through the use of computers. This information can be used for a
variety of endeavors, and criminal activity is a major one. In an effort to fight
this new crime wave, law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, and
investment firms are incorporating computer forensics into their infrastructure.
From network security breaches to child pornography investigations, the
common bridge is the demonstration that the particular electronic media
contained the incriminating evidence. Supportive examination procedures and
protocols should be in place in order to show that the electronic media contains
the incriminating evidence.
To assist law enforcement agencies and prosecutorial offices, a series of guides
dealing with digital evidence has been selected to address the complete
investigation process. This process expands from the crime scene through
analysis and finally into the courtroom. The guides summarize information from
a select group of practitioners who are knowledgeable about the subject
matter. These groups are more commonly known as technical working groups.
This guide is the second in a series. The first guide, Electronic Crime Scene
Investigation: A Guide for First Responders, is available through the National
Institute of Justice Web site at https://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/187736.htm.
The remaining guides in the series will address–
o-Using high technology to investigate.
o-Investigating high technology crimes.
o-Creating a digital evidence forensic unit.
o-Presenting digital evidence in the courtroom.
Because of the complex issues associated with digital evidence examination, the
Technical Working Group for the Examination of Digital Evidence (TWGEDE)
recognized that its recommendations may not be feasible in all circumstances.
The guide’s recommendations are not legal mandates or policy directives, nor
do they represent the only correct courses of action. Rather, the
recommendations represent a consensus of the diverse views and experiences
of the technical working group members who have provided valuable insight
into these important issues. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) expects that
each jurisdiction will be able to use these recommendations to spark
discussions and ensure that its practices and procedures are best suited to its
unique environment.
It is our hope that, through these materials, more of our Nation’s law
enforcement personnel will be trained to work effectively with digital evidence
and maximize the reliability of that evidence to the benefit of criminal case
prosecutions.
NIJ extends its appreciation to the participants in the TWGEDE for their
dedication to the preparation of this guide. Their efforts are particularly
commendable given that they were not relieved of their existing duties with their
home offices or agencies while they participated in the TWGEDE. What is
more, it was necessary for TWGEDE members to attend numerous (and
lengthy) guide preparation meetings that were held at locations far removed
from their home offices or agencies. In recognition of this, NIJ expresses great
appreciation for the commitment made by the home offices or agencies of
TWGEDE members in suffering the periodic unavailability of their employees.
Sarah V. Hart
Director
National Institute of Justice
—————————
Technical Working Group for the Examination of Digital Evidence
The process of developing the guide was initiated through an invitational
process. Invitees for the Technical Working Group for the Examination of
Digital Evidence (TWGEDE) were selected initially for their expertise with
digital evidence and then by their profession. The intent was to incorporate a
medley of individuals with law enforcement, corporate, or legal affiliations to
ensure a complete representation of the communities involved with digital
evidence.
A small core of individuals was invited to comprise the planning panel. The task
of the planning panel was to formulate a basic outline of topics that would be
considered for inclusion.
NIJ thanks Michael P. Everitt of the U.S. Postal Service, Office of Inspector
General, and Michael J. Menz. Both of these individuals provided their
invaluable time and expertise during the guide’s review process.
Planning panel
Susan Ballou
Program Manager, Forensic Science
Office of Law Enforcement Standards
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, Maryland
Kenneth Broderick
Special Agent
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
Computer Forensics Branch
Sterling, Virginia
Charles J. Faulk
Special Agent
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
Portland, Oregon
Grant Gottfried
Senior Specialist
National Center for Forensic Science
Orlando, Florida
Kim Herd
Criminal Law and Technology Counsel
National Association of Attorneys General
Washington, D.C.
Mark Johnson
Sergeant
Computer Crimes Unit
Kansas City, Missouri, Police
Kansas City, Missouri
Michael McCartney
Investigator
New York State Attorney General’s Office Criminal Prosecution Bureau-
Organized Crime Task Force
Buffalo, New York
Mark Menz
Digital Evidence Scientist
Folsom, California
Bill Moylan
Detective
Nassau County Police Department
Computer Crime Section
Crimes Against Property Squad
Westbury, New York
Glenn Nick
Assistant Director
U.S. Customs Service
Cyber Smuggling Center
Fairfax, Virginia
Todd Shipley
Detective Sergeant
Reno Police Department
Computer Crimes Unit
Reno, Nevada
Andy Siske
Defense Computer Investigation Training Program
Linthicum, Maryland
Chris Stippich
Digital Intelligence, Inc.
Waukesha, Wisconsin
TWGEDE members
Additional members were then incorporated into the TWGEDE to provide a
full technical working group. The individuals listed below, along with the
planning panel, worked together to formulate this guide.
Abigail Abraham
Assistant State’s Attorney
Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office Chicago, Illinois
Chris G. Andrist
Agent
Colorado Bureau of Investigation
Denver, Colorado
Sean Barry
Computer Forensics Assistant Lab Manager
New Technologies, Inc.
Gresham, Oregon
Bill Baugh
CEO
Savannah Technology Group
Savannah, Georgia
Randy Bishop
Special Agent in Charge
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Inspector General
Technology Crime Section
Washington, D.C.
Carleton Bryant
Staff Attorney
Knox County Sheriff’s Office
Knoxville, Tennessee
Don Buchwald
Project Engineer
The Aerospace Corporation
Los Angeles, California
Jaime Carazo
Special Agent
United States Secret Service
Electronic Crimes Branch
Washington, D.C.
Keith G. Chval
Chief, High Tech Crimes Bureau
Office of the Illinois Attorney General
Chicago, Illinois
Dorothy E. Denning
Professor
Computer Science Department
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.
Dan Dorman
Inspector
Postal Inspection Service
Atlanta, Georgia
James Doyle
Sergeant
Detective Bureau
New York City Police Department
Computer Investigation and Technology Unit
New York, New York
Michael Duncan
Staff/Sergeant
Economic Crime Branch
Technological Crime Section
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
Doug Elrick
Senior Forensic Specialist
Digital Intelligence
Waukesha, Wisconsin
Michael Finnie
Forensic Specialist
Computer Forensics Inc.
Seattle, Washington
Toby M. Finnie
Director
High Tech Crime Consortium
Tacoma, Washington
Paul T. French
Director, Consulting Services
New Technologies, Inc.
Computer Forensics Lab Manager
Gresham, Oregon
Pat Gilmore
Director
RedSiren, Inc.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Sam Guttman
Postal Inspector
Forensic and Technical Services
U.S. Postal Service
Dulles, Virginia
Dave Heslep
Sergeant
Maryland State Police
Computer Forensics Laboratory
Columbia, Maryland
Al Hobbs
Special Deputy U.S. Marshal
Child Exploitation Strike Force
Arlington Heights Police Department
Arlington Heights, Illinois
Robert Hopper
Sergeant
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Computer Forensic Unit
Phoenix, Arizona
Mary Horvath
Program Manager
FBI-CART
Washington, D.C.
Nigel Jones
Programme Manager
National High Tech Crime Training Centre
National Police Training
Wyboston Lakes Leisure Centre
United Kingdom
Roland Lascola
Cyber Security Specialist
Independent Oversight
U.S. Department of Energy
Washington, D.C.
Barry Leese
Lieutenant
Maryland State Police
Computer Crimes Unit
Columbia, Maryland
Glenn Lewis
Kroll Global Headquarters
New York, New York
Jason Luttgens
Computer Specialist, R&D
NASA Office of the Inspector General
Computer Crimes Division
Washington, D.C.
Dan Mares
President
Mares and Company, LLC
Lawrenceville, Georgia
Ralph McNamara
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
National Archives and Records Administration
Office of Inspector General
College Park, Maryland
Joel Moskowitz
Investigator
Clark County District Attorney’s Office
Las Vegas, Nevada
James K. Pace
Senior Special Agent
Chief of Computer Forensics and Investigations
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory
Forest Park, Georgia
Scott R. Patronik
Chief, Division of Technology and Advancement
Erie County Sheriff’s Office
Buffalo, New York
Greg Redfern
Director
Department of Defense Computer Investigations Training Program
Linthicum, Maryland
Henry R. Reeve
General Counsel
Second Judicial District
Denver, Colorado
Jim Riccardi, Jr.
Electronic Crime Specialist
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center-Northeast
Rome, New York
Greg Schmidt
Investigations/Technical
Computer Forensics Examiner
Plano, Texas
Howard Schmidt
Vice Chair
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
Washington, D.C.
Raemarie Schmidt
Computer Crimes Training Specialist
National White Collar Crime Center
Computer Crime Section
Fairmont, West Virginia
John A. Sgromolo
President
Digital Forensics, Inc.
Clearwater, Florida
George Sidor
Sr. Computer Forensics Investigator
G-Wag, Inc.
St. Albert, Alberta
Canada
Mike Weil
Computer Forensic Examiner
DoD Computer Forensics Laboratory
Linthicum, Maryland
—————————
Contents
Foreword
Technical Working Group for the Examination of Digital Evidence
Introduction
Chapter 1. Policy and Procedure Development
Chapter 2. Evidence Assessment
Chapter 3. Evidence Acquisition
Chapter 4. Evidence Examination
Chapter 5. Documenting and Reporting
Appendix A. Case Examples
Appendix B. Glossary
Appendix C. Sample Worksheets
Appendix D. Examples of Request for Service Forms
Appendix E. Legal Resources List
Appendix F. Technical Resources List
Appendix G. Training Resources List
Appendix H. List of Organizations
—————————
Introduction
Note: Terms that are defined in the glossary appear in bold italics on their first
appearance in the body of the report.
This guide is intended for use by law enforcement officers and other members
of the law enforcement community who are responsible for the examination of
digital evidence.
This guide is not all-inclusive. Rather, it deals with common situations
encountered during the examination of digital evidence. It is not a mandate for
the law enforcement community; it is a guide agencies can use to help them
develop their own policies and procedures.
Technology is advancing at such a rapid rate that the suggestions in this guide
are best examined in the context of current technology and practices. Each case
is unique and the judgment of the examiner should be given deference in the
implementation of the procedures suggested in this guide. Circumstances of
individual cases and Federal, State, and local laws/rules may also require
actions other than those described in this guide.
When dealing with digital evidence, the following general forensic and
procedural principles should be applied:
o-Actions taken to secure and collect digital evidence should not affect the
integrity of that evidence.
o-Persons conducting an examination of digital evidence should be trained for
that purpose.
o-Activity relating to the seizure, examination, storage, or transfer of digital
evidence should be documented, preserved, and available for review.
Through all of this, the examiner should be cognizant of the need to conduct an
accurate and impartial examination of the digital evidence.
How is digital evidence processed?
Assessment. Computer forensic examiners should assess digital evidence
thoroughly with respect to the scope of the case to determine the course of
action to take.
Acquisition. Digital evidence, by its very nature, is fragile and can be altered,
damaged, or destroyed by improper handling or examination. Examination is
best conducted on a copy of the original evidence. The original evidence should
be acquired in a manner that protects and preserves the integrity of the
evidence.
Examination. The purpose of the examination process is to extract and analyze
digital evidence. Extraction refers to the recovery of data from its media.
Analysis refers to the interpretation of the recovered data and putting it in a
logical and useful format.
Documenting and reporting. Actions and observations should be documented
throughout the forensic processing of evidence. This will conclude with the
preparation of a written report of the findings.
Is your agency prepared to handle digital evidence?
This document recommends that agencies likely to handle digital evidence
identify appropriate external resources for the processing of digital evidence
before they are needed. These resources should be readily available for
situations that are beyond the technical expertise or resources of the
department. It is also recommended that agencies develop policies and
procedures to ensure compliance with Federal, State, and local laws.
The following five topics describe the necessary basic steps to conduct a
computer forensic examination and suggest the order in which they should be
conducted. Although documentation is listed as the last step, a well-trained
examiner understands that documentation is continuous throughout the entire
examination process.
1. Policy and Procedure Development
2. Evidence Assessment
3. Evidence Acquisition
4. Evidence Examination
5. Documenting and Reporting
Each of these steps is explained further in the subsequent chapters. The
chapters are further supported by the specialized information provided in the
appendixes.
—————————
Chapter 1. Policy and Procedure Development
Principle: Computer forensics as a discipline demands specially trained
personnel, support from management, and the necessary funding to keep a unit
operating. This can be attained by constructing a comprehensive training
program for examiners, sound digital evidence recovery techniques, and a
commitment to keep any developed unit operating at maximum efficiency.
Procedure: Departments should create policies and procedures for the
establishment and/or operation of a computer forensics unit.
Protocols and procedures
Mission statement
Developing policies and procedures that establish the parameters for operation
and function is an important phase of creating a computer forensics unit. An
effective way to begin this task is to develop a mission statement that
incorporates the core functions of the unit, whether those functions include
high-technology crime investigations, evidence collection, or forensic analysis.
Personnel
The policies and procedures should consider defining the personnel
requirements for the unit. Topics that might be included in this section are job
descriptions and minimum qualifications, hours of operation, on-call duty status,
command structure, and team configuration.
Administrative considerations
Software licensing. Ensure that all software used by the computer forensics unit
is properly licensed by the agency or an individual assigned to the unit.
Resource commitment. Establishing and operating a computer forensics unit
may require significant allocation of financial resources and personnel. Many of
the expenses are recurring and will have to be budgeted on a yearly basis.
Resource allocation should include the type of facility that will house the unit,
equipment used by examiners, software and hardware requirements, upgrades,
training, and ongoing professional development and retention of examiners.
Training. It is important that computer forensics units maintain skilled,
competent examiners. This can be accomplished by developing the skills of
existing personnel or hiring individuals from specific disciplines. Because of the
dynamic nature of the field, a comprehensive ongoing training plan should be
developed based on currently available training resources and should be
considered in budget submissions. Consideration may also be given to mentor
programs, on-the-job training, and other forms of career development.
Service request and intake
Guidelines should be developed to establish a process for the submission of
forensic service requests and the intake of accepted requests for examination of
digital evidence. Topics to consider in these guidelines include request and
intake forms, point of contact, required documentation, acceptance criteria,*
and requirements for the submission of physical evidence. Field personnel are
expected to know the policies for service request and intake.
Case management
Once a request for forensic services is approved, criteria for prioritizing and
assigning examinations should be determined and implemented. Criteria may
include the nature of the crime, court dates, deadlines, potential victims, legal
considerations, volatile nature of the evidence, and available resources.
Evidence handling and retention
Guidelines should be established for receiving, processing, documenting, and
handling evidence and work products associated with the examination. The
guidelines should be consistent with existing departmental policy. However,
criteria for digital evidence handling and retention may exceed established
departmental policies. Note: Evidence identified as contraband, such as child
pornography, may require special consideration, such as obtaining specific
contraband-related seizure and search warrants.
It is important to remember that other forensic disciplines might be able to
recover other evidence, such as fingerprints on the hard drive, hair or fibers in
the keyboard, and handwritten disk labels or printed material. In these
instances, procedures should be developed to determine the order and manner
in which examinations should be performed to reap full evidentiary value.
Case processing
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) should be developed for preserving
and processing digital evidence. SOPs should be general enough to address the
basic steps in a routine forensic examination while providing flexibility to
respond to unique circumstances arising from unforeseen situations.
Developing technical procedures
Established procedures should guide the technical process of the examination of
evidence. Procedures should be tested prior to their implementation to ensure
that the results obtained are valid and independently reproducible. The steps in
the development and validation of the procedures should be documented and
include:
o-Identifying the task or problem.
o-Proposing possible solutions.
o-Testing each solution on a known control sample.
o-Evaluating the results of the test.
o-Finalizing the procedure.
Original evidence should never be used to develop procedures.
*One particular scenario for which an acceptance criteria policy and procedure
may be helpful is one in which field personnel have made post-seizure changes
to the evidence. This sometimes occurs when field personnel, often unaware of
the effects of their actions, attempt to look for files on the original media,
thereby changing date and time stamps associated with those files and possibly
affecting other data on the media. Although perhaps not fatal to the case, this is
one factor that likely would require documentation and should be considered
before accepting this service request. One step in this procedure might be to
submit the facts to the relevant prosecuting agency to determine whether it
would consider the case to be viable, given the post-seizure alteration.
—————————
Chapter 2. Evidence Assessment
Principle: The digital evidence should be thoroughly assessed with respect to
the scope of the case to determine the course of action.
Procedure: Conduct a thorough assessment by reviewing the search warrant or
other legal authorization, case detail, nature of hardware and software, potential
evidence sought, and the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the
evidence to be examined.
Case assessment
o-Review the case investigator’s request for service.
-Identify the legal authority for the forensic examination request.
-Ensure there is a completed request for assistance (see appendix D for
examples).
-Complete documentation of chain of custody.
o-Consult with the case investigator about the case and let him or her know
what the forensic examination may or may not discover. When talking with the
investigator about the facts of the case, consider the following:
-Discuss whether other forensic processes need to be performed on the
evidence (e.g., DNA analysis, fingerprint, toolmarks, trace, and questioned
documents).
-Discuss the possibility of pursuing other investigative avenues to obtain
additional digital evidence (e.g., sending a preservation order to an Internet
service provider (ISP), identifying remote storage locations, obtaining e-mail).
-Consider the relevance of peripheral components to the investigation. For
example, in forgery or fraud cases consider noncomputer equipment such as
laminators, credit card blanks, check paper, scanners, and printers. In child
pornography cases consider digital cameras.
-Determine the potential evidence being sought (e.g., photographs,
spreadsheets, documents, databases, financial records).
-Determine additional information regarding the case (e.g., aliases, e-mail
accounts, e-mail addresses, ISP used, names, network configuration and users,
system logs, passwords, user names). This information may be obtained
through interviews with the system administrator, users, and employees.
-Assess the skill levels of the computer users involved. Techniques
employed by skilled users to conceal or destroy evidence may be more
sophisticated (e.g., encryption, booby traps, steganography).
-Prioritize the order in which evidence is to be examined.
-Determine if additional personnel will be needed.
-Determine the equipment needed.
The assessment might uncover evidence pertaining to other criminal activity
(e.g., money laundering in conjunction with narcotics activities).
Onsite considerations
The following material does not provide complete information on examination of
digital evidence; it is a general guide for law enforcement agencies that assess
digital evidence at the crime scene. Readers may also want to consult Electronic
Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders, available at
https://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/187736.htm.
Consider safety of personnel at the scene. Always ensure the scene is properly
secured before and during the search.
In some cases, the examiner may only have the opportunity to do the following
while onsite:
o-Identify the number and type of computers.
o-Determine if a network is present.
o-Interview the system administrator and users.
o-Identify and document the types and volume of media, including removable
media. Document the location from which the media was removed.
o-Identify offsite storage areas and/or remote computing locations.
o-Identify proprietary software.
o-Evaluate general conditions of the site.
o-Determine the operating system in question.
Determine the need for and contact available outside resources, if necessary.
Establish and retain a phone list of such resources.
Processing location assessment
Assess the evidence to determine where the examination should occur. It is
preferable to complete an examination in a controlled environment, such as a
dedicated forensic work area or laboratory. Whenever circumstances require
an onsite examination to be conducted, attempt to control the environment.
Assessment considerations might include the following:
o-The time needed onsite to accomplish evidence recovery.
o-Logistic and personnel concerns associated with long-term deployment.
o-The impact on the business due to a lengthy search.
o-The suitability of equipment, resources, media, training, and experience for
an onsite examination.
Legal considerations
o-Determine the extent of the authority to search.
o-Identify possible concerns related to applicable Federal statutes (such as the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) and the Cable
Communications Policy Act (CCPA), both as amended by the USA
PATRIOT ACT of 2001, and/or the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (PPA)),
State statutes, and local policies and laws.
If evidence is located that was not authorized in the original search authority,
determine what additional legal process may be necessary to continue the
search (e.g., warrant, amended consent form). Contact legal advisors for
assistance if needed.
Evidence assessment
o-Prioritize the evidence (e.g., distribution CDs versus user-created CDs).
-Location where evidence is found.
-Stability of media to be examined.
-Determine how to document the evidence (e.g., photograph, sketch, notes).
-Evaluate storage locations for electromagnetic interference.
-Ascertain the condition of the evidence as a result of packaging, transport,
or storage.
-Assess the need to provide continuous electric power to battery-operated
devices.
Note: The procedures outlined are based on a compilation of generally
accepted practices. Consult individual agency policy and seek legal advice, if
necessary, before initiating an examination. Actual conditions may require
alternative steps to those outlined in this guide. A thorough case assessment is a
foundation for subsequent procedures.
—————————
Chapter 3. Evidence Acquisition
Principle: Digital evidence, by its very nature, is fragile and can be altered,
damaged, or destroyed by improper handling or examination. For these reasons
special precautions should be taken to preserve this type of evidence. Failure to
do so may render it unusable or lead to an inaccurate conclusion.
Procedure: Acquire the original digital evidence in a manner that protects and
preserves the evidence. The following bullets outline the basic steps:
o-Secure digital evidence in accordance with departmental guidelines. In the
absence of such guidelines, useful information can be found in Electronic Crime
Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders
(https://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/187736.htm).
o-Document hardware and software configuration of the examiner’s system.
o-Verify operation of the examiner’s computer system to include hardware and
software.
o-Disassemble the case of the computer to be examined to permit physical
access to the storage devices.
-Take care to ensure equipment is protected from static electricity and
magnetic fields.
o-Identify storage devices that need to be acquired. These devices can be
internal, external, or both.
o-Document internal storage devices and hardware configuration.
-Drive condition (e.g., make, model, geometry, size, jumper settings,
location, drive interface).
-Internal components (e.g., sound card; video card; network card, including
media access control (MAC) address; personal computer memory card
international association (PCMCIA) cards).
o-Disconnect storage devices (using the power connector or data cable from
the back of the drive or from the motherboard) to prevent the destruction,
damage, or alteration of data.
o-Retrieve configuration information from the suspect’s system through
controlled boots.
-Perform a controlled boot to capture CMOS/BIOS information and test
functionality.
–Boot sequence (this may mean changing the BIOS to ensure the system
boots from the floppy or CD-ROM drive).
–Time and date.
–Power on passwords.
-Perform a second controlled boot to test the computer’s functionality and
the forensic boot disk.
–Ensure the power and data cables are properly connected to the floppy or
CD-ROM drive, and ensure the power and data cables to the storage devices
are still disconnected.
–Place the forensic boot disk into the floppy or CD-ROM drive. Boot the
computer and ensure the computer will boot from the forensic boot disk.
-Reconnect the storage devices and perform a third controlled boot to
capture the drive configuration information from the CMOS/BIOS.
–Ensure there is a forensic boot disk in the floppy or CD-ROM drive to
prevent the computer from accidentally booting from the storage devices.
–Drive configuration information includes logical block addressing (LBA);
large disk; cylinders, heads, and sectors (CHS); or auto-detect.
o-Power system down.
o-Whenever possible, remove the subject storage device and perform the
acquisition using the examiner’s system. When attaching the subject device to
the examiner’s system, configure the storage device so that it will be recognized.
o-Exceptional circumstances, including the following, may result in a decision
not to remove the storage devices from the subject system:
-RAID (redundant array of inexpensive disks). Removing the disks and
acquiring them individually may not yield usable results.
-Laptop systems. The system drive may be difficult to access or may be
unusable when detached from the original system.
-Hardware dependency (legacy equipment). Older drives may not be
readable in newer systems.
-Equipment availability. The examiner does not have access to necessary
equipment.
-Network storage. It may be necessary to use the network equipment to
acquire the data.
When using the subject computer to acquire digital evidence, reattach the
subject storage device and attach the examiner’s evidence storage device (e.g.,
hard drive, tape drive, CD-RW, MO).
o-Ensure that the examiner’s storage device is forensically clean when
acquiring the evidence.
Write protection should be initiated, if available, to preserve and protect
original evidence.
Note: The examiner should consider creating a known value for the subject
evidence prior to acquiring the evidence (e.g., performing an independent cyclic
redundancy check (CRC), hashing). Depending on the selected acquisition
method, this process may already be completed.
o-If hardware write protection is used:
-Install a write protection device.
-Boot system with the examiner’s controlled operating system.
o-If software write protection is used:
-Boot system with the examiner-controlled operating system.
-Activate write protection.
o-Investigate the geometry of any storage devices to ensure that all space is
accounted for, including host-protected data areas (e.g., nonhost specific data
such as the partition table matches the physical geometry of the drive).
o-Capture the electronic serial number of the drive and other user-accessible,
host-specific data.
o-Acquire the subject evidence to the examiner’s storage device using the
appropriate software and hardware tools, such as:
-Stand-alone duplication software.
-Forensic analysis software suite.
-Dedicated hardware devices.
o-Verify successful acquisition by comparing known values of the original and
the copy or by doing a sector-by-sector comparison of the original to the copy.
—————————
Chapter 4. Evidence Examination
Principle: General forensic principles apply when examining digital evidence.
Different types of cases and media may require different methods of
examination. Persons conducting an examination of digital evidence should be
trained for this purpose.
Procedure: Conduct the examination on data that have been acquired using
accepted forensic procedures. Whenever possible, the examination should not
be conducted on original evidence.
This chapter discusses the extraction and the analysis of digital evidence.
Extraction refers to the recovery of data from the media. Analysis refers to the
interpretation of the recovered data and placement of it in a logical and useful
format (e.g., how did it get there, where did it come from, and what does it
mean?). The concepts offered are intended to assist the examiner in developing
procedures and structuring the examination of the digital evidence. These
concepts are not intended to be all-inclusive and recognize that not all of the
following techniques may be used in a case. It is up to the discretion of the
examiner to select the appropriate approach.
When conducting evidence examination, consider using the following steps:
Step 1. Preparation
Prepare working directory/directories on separate media to which evidentiary
files and data can be recovered and/or extracted.
Step 2. Extraction
Discussed below are two different types of extraction, physical and logical. The
physical extraction phase identifies and recovers data across the entire physical
drive without regard to file system. The logical extraction phase identifies and
recovers files and data based on the installed operating system(s), file
system(s), and/or application(s).
Physical extraction
During this stage the extraction of the data from the drive occurs at the physical
level regardless of file systems present on the drive. This may include the
following methods: keyword searching, file carving, and extraction of the
partition table and unused space on the physical drive.
o-Performing a keyword search across the physical drive may be useful as it
allows the examiner to extract data that may not be accounted for by the
operating system and file system.
o-File carving utilities processed across the physical drive may assist in
recovering and extracting useable files and data that may not be accounted for
by the operating system and file system.
o-Examining the partition structure may identify the file systems present and
determine if the entire physical size of the hard drive is accounted for.
Logical extraction
During this stage the extraction of the data from the drive is based on the file
system(s) present on the drive and may include data from such areas as active
files, deleted files, file slack, and unallocated file space. Steps may include:
o-Extraction of the file system information to reveal characteristics such as
directory structure, file attributes, file names, date and time stamps, file size, and
file location.
o-Data reduction to identify and eliminate known files through the comparison
of calculated hash values to authenticated hash values.
o-Extraction of files pertinent to the examination. Methods to accomplish this
may be based on file name and extension, file header, file content, and location
on the drive.
o-Recovery of deleted files.
o-Extraction of password-protected, encrypted, and compressed data.
o-Extraction of file slack.
o-Extraction of the unallocated space.
Step 3. Analysis of extracted data
Analysis is the process of interpreting the extracted data to determine their
significance to the case. Some examples of analysis that may be performed
include timeframe, data hiding, application and file, and ownership and
possession. Analysis may require a review of the request for service, legal
authority for the search of the digital evidence, investigative leads, and/or
analytical leads.
Timeframe analysis
Timeframe analysis can be useful in determining when events occurred on a
computer system, which can be used as a part of associating usage of the
computer to an individual(s) at the time the events occurred. Two methods that
can be used are:
o-Reviewing the time and date stamps contained in the file system metadata
(e.g., last modified, last accessed, created, change of status) to link files of
interest to the timeframes relevant to the investigation. An example of this
analysis would be using the last modified date and time to establish when the
contents of a file were last changed.
o-Reviewing system and application logs that may be present. These may
include error logs, installation logs, connection logs, security logs, etc. For
example, examination of a security log may indicate when a user
name/password combination was used to log into a system.
Note: Take into consideration any differences in the individual’s computer date
and time as reported in the BIOS.
Data hiding analysis
Data can be concealed on a computer system. Data hiding analysis can be
useful in detecting and recovering such data and may indicate knowledge,
ownership, or intent. Methods that can be used include:
o-Correlating the file headers to the corresponding file extensions to identify
any mismatches. Presence of mismatches may indicate that the user intentionally
hid data.
o-Gaining access to all password-protected, encrypted, and compressed files,
which may indicate an attempt to conceal the data from unauthorized users. A
password itself may be as relevant as the contents of the file.
o-Steganography.
o-Gaining access to a host-protected area (HPA). The presence of
user-created data in an HPA may indicate an attempt to conceal data.
Application and file analysis
Many programs and files identified may contain information relevant to the
investigation and provide insight into the capability of the system and the
knowledge of the user. Results of this analysis may indicate additional steps that
need to be taken in the extraction and analysis processes. Some examples
include:
o-Reviewing file names for relevance and patterns.
o-Examining file content.
o-Identifying the number and type of operating system(s).
o-Correlating the files to the installed applications.
o-Considering relationships between files. For example, correlating Internet
history to cache files and e-mail files to e-mail attachments.
o-Identifying unknown file types to determine their value to the investigation.
o-Examining the users’ default storage location(s) for applications and the file
structure of the drive to determine if files have been stored in their default or an
alternate location(s).
o-Examining user-configuration settings.
o-Analyzing file metadata, the content of the user-created file containing data
additional to that presented to the user, typically viewed through the application
that created it. For example, files created with word processing applications
may include authorship, time last edited, number of times edited, and where
they were printed or saved.
Ownership and possession
In some instances it may be essential to identify the individual(s) who created,
modified, or accessed a file. It may also be important to determine ownership
and knowledgeable possession of the questioned data. Elements of
knowledgeable possession may be based on the analysis described above,
including one or more of the following factors.
o-Placing the subject at the computer at a particular date and time may help
determine ownership and possession (timeframe analysis).
o-Files of interest may be located in nondefault locations (e.g., user-created
directory named «child porn») (application and file analysis).
o-The file name itself may be of evidentiary value and also may indicate the
contents of the file (application and file analysis).
o-Hidden data may indicate a deliberate attempt to avoid detection (hidden
data analysis).
o-If the passwords needed to gain access to encrypted and
password-protected files are recovered, the passwords themselves may
indicate possession or ownership (hidden data analysis).
o-Contents of a file may indicate ownership or possession by containing
information specific to a user (application and file analysis).
Step 4. Conclusion
In and of themselves, results obtained from any one of these steps may not be
sufficient to draw a conclusion. When viewed as a whole, however,
associations between individual results may provide a more complete picture.
As a final step in the examination process, be sure to consider the results of the
extraction and analysis in their entirety.
—————————
Chapter 5. Documenting and Reporting
Principle: The examiner is responsible for completely and accurately reporting
his or her findings and the results of the analysis of the digital evidence
examination. Documentation is an ongoing process throughout the examination.
It is important to accurately record the steps taken during the digital evidence
examination.
Procedure: All documentation should be complete, accurate, and
comprehensive. The resulting report should be written for the intended
audience.
Examiner’s notes
Documentation should be contemporaneous with the examination, and retention
of notes should be consistent with departmental policies. The following is a list
of general considerations that may assist the examiner throughout the
documentation process.
o-Take notes when consulting with the case investigator and/or prosecutor.
o-Maintain a copy of the search authority with the case notes.
o-Maintain the initial request for assistance with the case file.
o-Maintain a copy of chain of custody documentation.
o-Take notes detailed enough to allow complete duplication of actions.
o-Include in the notes dates, times, and descriptions and results of actions
taken.
o-Document irregularities encountered and any actions taken regarding the
irregularities during the examination.
o-Include additional information, such as network topology, list of authorized
users, user agreements, and/or passwords.
o-Document changes made to the system or network by or at the direction of
law enforcement or the examiner.
o-Document the operating system and relevant software version and current,
installed patches.
o-Document information obtained at the scene regarding remote storage,
remote user access, and offsite backups.
During the course of an examination, information of evidentiary value may be
found that is beyond the scope of the current legal authority. Document this
information and bring it to the attention of the case agent because the
information may be needed to obtain additional search authorities.
Examiner’s report
This section provides guidance in preparing the report that will be submitted to
the investigator, prosecutor, and others. These are general suggestions;
departmental policy may dictate report writing specifics, such as its order and
contents. The report may include:
o-Identity of the reporting agency.
o-Case identifier or submission number.
o-Case investigator.
o-Identity of the submitter.
o-Date of receipt.
o-Date of report.
o-Descriptive list of items submitted for examination, including serial number,
make, and model.
o-Identity and signature of the examiner.
o-Brief description of steps taken during examination, such as string searches,
graphics image searches, and recovering erased files.
o-Results/conclusions.
The following sections have been found to be useful in other report formats.
See appendix A for sample reports.
Summary of findings
This section may consist of a brief summary of the results of the examinations
performed on the items submitted for analysis. All findings listed in the summary
should also be contained in the details of findings section of the report.
Details of findings
This section should describe in greater detail the results of the examinations and
may include:
o-Specific files related to the request.
o-Other files, including deleted files, that support the findings.
o-String searches, keyword searches, and text string searches.
o-Internet-related evidence, such as Web site traffic analysis, chat logs, cache
files, e-mail, and news group activity.
o-Graphic image analysis.
o-Indicators of ownership, which could include program registration data.
o-Data analysis.
o-Description of relevant programs on the examined items.
o-Techniques used to hide or mask data, such as encryption, steganography,
hidden attributes, hidden partitions, and file name anomalies.
Supporting materials
List supporting materials that are included with the report, such as printouts of
particular items of evidence, digital copies of evidence, and chain of custody
documentation.
Glossary
A glossary may be included with the report to assist the reader in understanding
any technical terms used. Use a generally accepted source for the definition of
the terms and include appropriate references.
—————————
Appendix A. Case Examples
The following two case briefs are examples of what could be involved in case
analysis.
Disclaimer: The chosen case scenarios are for instructional purposes only and
any association to an actual case and litigation is purely coincidental. Names
and locations presented in the case scenarios are fictitious and are not intended
to reflect actual people or places. Reference herein to any specific commercial
products, processes, or services by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or
favoring by the U.S., State, or local governments, and the information and
statements shall not be used for the purposes of advertising.
Case brief 1
SUBJECT owned a roofing company. SUBJECT gave his laptop computer to
an employee to take to Mom & Pop’s Computer Repair for monitor problems.
Upon repairing the laptop, Mom of Mom & Pop’s started the laptop to ensure
the monitor had been fixed. A standard procedure of Mom & Pop’s was to go
to the Recent menu on the Start Bar of Windows 98 systems and select files
for viewing. Mom was presented with what appeared to be an image of a
young child depicted in a sexually explicit manner. Mom telephoned the county
sheriff. A sheriff’s deputy responded and observed the image and confirmed it
to be a violation of a State statute. The laptop was seized because it contained
contraband. The seizure was performed in a manner consistent with
recommendations found in Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for
First Responders. The laptop was entered into evidence according to agency
policy, and a search warrant was obtained for the examination of the computer.
The computer was submitted for examination.
Objective: To determine whether SUBJECT possessed child pornography.
This was complicated by the number of people who handled the laptop.
Computer type: Generic laptop, serial # 123456789.
Operating system: Microsoft Windows 98.
Offense: Possession of child pornography.
Case agent: Investigator Johnson.
Evidence number: 012345.
Chain of custody: See attached form.
Where examination took place: Criminal investigations unit.
Tools used: Disk acquisition utility, universal graphic viewer, command line.
Processing
Assessment: Reviewed the case investigator’s request for service. The search
warrant provided legal authority. The investigator was interested in finding all
information pertaining to child pornography, access dates, and ownership of the
computer. It was determined that the equipment needed was available in the
forensic lab.
Acquisition: The hardware configuration was documented and a duplicate of the
hard drive was created in a manner that protected and preserved the evidence.
The CMOS information, including the time and date, was documented.
Examination: The directory and file structures, including file dates and times,
were recorded. A file header search was conducted to locate all graphic
images. The image files were reviewed and those files containing images of what
appeared to be children depicted in a sexually explicit manner were preserved.
Shortcut files were recovered that pointed to files on floppy disks with sexually
explicit file names involving children. The last accessed time and date of the files
indicated the files were last accessed 10 days before the laptop was delivered
to Mom & Pop’s.
Documentation and reporting: The investigator was given a report describing
the findings of the examination. The investigator determined that he needed to
conduct interviews.
Next step: The employee who delivered the laptop computer to Mom & Pop’s
Computer Repair was interviewed, and he indicated that he had never operated
the computer. Further, the employee stated SUBJECT had shown him images
of a sexual nature involving children on the laptop. SUBJECT told the
employee that he keeps his pictures on floppy disks at home; he just forgot this
one image on the laptop.
The State’s Attorney’s Office was briefed in hope of obtaining a search warrant
for SUBJECT’s home based on the examination of the digital evidence and the
interview of the employee. A warrant was drafted, presented to a judicial
officer, and signed. During the subsequent search, floppy disks were
discovered at SUBJECT’s house. Forensic examination of the floppies revealed
additional child pornography, including images in which SUBJECT was a
participant. This resulted in the arrest of SUBJECT.
Case brief 1 report
REPORT OF MEDIA ANALYSIS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
County Sheriff’s Police
Investigator Johnson
Anytown, USA 01234
SUBJECT:
Forensic Media Analysis Report
SUBJECT: DOE, JOHN
Case Number: 012345
1. Status: Closed.
2. Summary of Findings:
o-327 files containing images of what appeared to be children depicted in a
sexually explicit manner were recovered.
o-34 shortcut files that pointed to files on floppy disks with sexually explicit file
names involving children were recovered.
3. Items Analyzed:
TAG NUMBER: 012345
ITEM DESCRIPTION: One Generic laptop, Serial # 123456789
4. Details of Findings:
o-Findings in this paragraph related to the Generic Hard Drive, Model
ABCDE, Serial # 3456ABCD, recovered from Tag Number 012345, One
Generic laptop, Serial # 123456789.
1) The examined hard drive was found to contain a Microsoft Windows
98 operating system.
2) The directory and file listing for the media was saved to the Microsoft
Access Database TAG012345.MDB.
3) The directory C:\JOHN DOE\PERSONAL\FAV PICS\, was found to
contain 327 files containing images of what appeared to be children depicted in
a sexually explicit manner. The file directory for 327 files disclosed that the files’
creation date and times are 5 July 2001 between 11:33 p.m. and 11:45 p.m.,
and the last access date for 326 files listed is 27 December 2001. In addition,
the file directory information for one file disclosed the last access date as 6
January 2002.
4) The directory C:\JOHN DOE\PERSONAL\FAV PICS TO DISK\
contained 34 shortcut files that pointed to files on floppy disks with sexually
explicit file names involving children. The file directory information for the 34
shortcut files disclosed the files’ creation date and times are 5 July 2001
between 11:23 p.m. and 11:57 p.m., and the last access date for the 34
shortcut files was listed as 5 July 2001.
5) The directory C:\JOHN DOE\LEGAL\ contained five Microsoft Word
documents related to various contract relationships John Doe Roofing had with
other entities.
6) The directory C:\JOHN DOE\JOHN DOE ROOFING\ contained files
related to operation of John Doe Roofing.
7) No further user-created files were present on the media.
5. Glossary:
Shortcut File: A file created that links to another file.
6. Items Provided: In addition to this hard copy report, one compact disk (CD)
was submitted with an electronic copy of this report. The report on CD
contains hyperlinks to the above-mentioned files and directories.
IMA D. EXAMINER
Computer Forensic Examiner
Released by:
—————————
Case brief 2
A concerned citizen contacted the police department regarding possible stolen
property. He told police that while he was searching the Internet, hoping to find
a motorcycle for a reasonable price, he found an ad that met his requirements.
This ad listed a Honda motorcycle for a low price, so he contacted the seller.
Upon meeting the seller he became suspicious that the motorcycle was stolen.
After hearing this information, police alerted the Auto Theft Unit. The Auto
Theft Unit conducted a sting operation to purchase the motorcycle. Undercover
officers met with the suspect, who, after receiving payment, provided them with
the vehicle, a vehicle title, registration card, and insurance card. The suspect
was arrested and the vehicle he was driving was searched incident to his arrest.
During the search, a notebook computer was seized. Although the documents
provided by the suspect looked authentic, document examiners determined that
the documents were counterfeit. The auto theft investigator contacted the
computer forensic laboratory for assistance in examining the seized computer.
The investigator obtained a search warrant to analyze the computer and search
for materials used in making counterfeit documents and other evidence related
to the auto theft charges. The laptop computer was submitted to the computer
forensic laboratory for analysis.
Objective: Determine if the suspect used the laptop computer as an instrument
of the crimes of Auto Theft, Fraud, Forgery, Uttering False Documents, and
Possession of Counterfeit Vehicle Titles and/or as a repository of data related
to those crimes.
Computer type: Gateway Solo 9100 notebook computer.
Operating system: Microsoft Windows 98.
Offenses: Auto Theft, Fraud, Forgery, Uttering False Documents, and
Possession of Counterfeit Vehicle Titles.
Case agent: Auto Theft Unit Investigator.
Where examination took place: Computer Forensic Laboratory.
Tools used: Guidance Software EnCase , DIGit, Jasc
Software Quick View Plus, and AccessData Password Recovery Tool
Kit .
Processing
Assessment
1. Documentation provided by the investigator was reviewed.
a. Legal authority was established by a search warrant obtained specifically
for the examination of the computer in a laboratory setting.
b. Chain of custody was properly documented on the appropriate
departmental forms.
c. The request for service and a detailed summary explained the investigation,
provided keyword lists, and provided information about the suspect, the stolen
vehicle, the counterfeit documents, and the Internet advertisement. The
investigator also provided photocopies of the counterfeit documents.
2. The computer forensic investigator met with the case agent and discussed
additional investigative avenues and potential evidence being sought in the
investigation.
3. Evidence intake was completed.
a. The evidence was marked and photographed.
b. A file was created and the case information was entered into the laboratory
database.
c. The computer was stored in the laboratory’s property room.
4. The case was assigned to a computer forensic investigator.
Imaging
1. The notebook computer was examined and photographed.
a. The hardware was examined and documented.
b. A controlled boot disk was placed in the computer’s floppy drive. The
computer was powered on and the BIOS setup program was entered. The
BIOS information was documented and the system time was compared to a
trusted time source and documented. The boot sequence was checked and
documented; the system was already set to boot from the floppy drive first.
c. The notebook computer was powered off without making any changes to
the BIOS.
2. EnCase was used to create an evidence file containing the image of the
notebook computer’s hard drive.
a. The notebook computer was connected to a laboratory computer through a
null-modem cable, which connected to the computers’ parallel ports.
b. The notebook computer was booted to the DOS prompt with a controlled
boot disk and EnCase was started in server mode.
c. The laboratory computer, equipped with a magneto-optical drive for file
storage, was booted to the DOS prompt with a controlled boot disk. EnCase
was started in server mode and evidence files for the notebook computer were
acquired and written to magneto-optical disks.
d. When the imaging process was completed, the computers were powered
off.
i. The notebook computer was returned to the laboratory property room.
ii. The magneto-optical disks containing the EnCase evidence files were
write-protected and entered into evidence.
Analysis
1. A laboratory computer was prepared with Windows 98, EnCase for
Windows, and other forensic software programs.
2. The EnCase evidence files from the notebook computer were copied to
the laboratory computer’s hard drive.
3. A new EnCase case file was opened and the notebook computer’s
evidence files were examined using EnCase .
a. Deleted files were recovered by EnCase .
b. File data, including file names, dates and times, physical and logical size,
and complete path, were recorded.
c. Keyword text searches were conducted based on information provided by
the investigator. All hits were reviewed.
d. Graphics files were opened and viewed.
e. HTML files were opened and viewed.
f. Data files were opened and viewed; two password-protected and
encrypted files were located.
g. Unallocated and slack space were searched.
h. Files of evidentiary value or investigative interest were copied/unerased
from the EnCase evidence file and copied to a compact disk.
4. Unallocated clusters were copied/unerased from the EnCase evidence
file to a clean hard drive, wiped to U.S. Department of Defense
recommendations (DoD 5200.28-STD). DIGit was then used to
carve images from unallocated space. The carved images were extracted from
DIGit , opened, and viewed. A total of 8,476 images were
extracted.
5. The password-protected files were copied/unerased to a 1.44 MB
floppy disk. AccessData Password Recovery Tool Kit was run on the
files and passwords were recovered for both files. The files were opened using
the passwords and viewed.
Findings
The analysis of the notebook computer resulted in the recovery of 176 files of
evidentiary value or investigative interest. The recovered files included:
1. 59 document files including documents containing the suspect’s name and
personal information; text included in the counterfeit documents; scanned
payroll, corporate, and certified checks; text concerning and describing stolen
items; and text describing the recovered motorcycle.
2. 38 graphics files including high-resolution image files depicting payroll,
corporate, and certified checks; U.S. currency; vehicle titles; registration cards
and driver’s license templates from Georgia and other States; insurance cards
from various companies; and counterfeit certified checks payable to a computer
company ranging from $25,000 to $40,000 for the purchase of notebook
computers. Most graphics were scanned.
3. 63 HTML files including Hotmail and Yahoo e-mail and classified
advertisements for the recovered motorcycle, other vehicles, and several
brands of notebook computers; e-mail text, including e-mails between the
suspect and the concerned citizen concerning the sale of the recovered
motorcycle; and e-mails between the suspect and a computer company
concerning the purchase of notebook computers.
4. 14 graphics files carved from unallocated space depicting checks at
various stages of completion and scanned images of U.S. currency.
5. Two password-protected and encrypted files.
a. WordPerfect document containing a list of personal information on
several individuals including names, addresses, dates of birth, credit card and
bank account numbers and expiration dates, checking account information, and
other information. Password [nomoresecrets].
b. Microsoft Word document containing vehicle title information for the
recovered motorcycle. Password [HELLO].
Documentation
1. Forensic Report – All actions, processes, and findings were described in
a detailed Forensic Report, which is maintained in the laboratory case file.
2. Police Report – The case agent was provided with a police report
describing the evidence examined, techniques used, and the findings.
3. Work Product – A compact disk containing files and file data of
evidentiary value or investigative interest was created. The original was stored
in the laboratory case file. Copies were provided to the case agent and the
prosecutor.
Summary
Based on the information revealed by the computer analysis, several new
avenues of investigation were opened.
By contacting the victims listed in the password-protected WordPerfect
document, investigators learned that the victims had all been robbed in the same
city during the previous summer by an individual meeting the description of the
suspect.
Contact with the computer company revealed the counterfeit checks
found on the suspect’s computer had been accepted for the purchase of
computers, and that the computers were shipped to him and were the subject
of an ongoing investigation. Model numbers and serial numbers provided by the
computer company matched several of the Hotmail and Yahoo classified
ads found on the suspect’s computer.
Several of the counterfeit checks found on the suspect’s computer were
already the subject of ongoing investigations.
Information recovered concerning other vehicles led to the recovery of
additional stolen vehicles.
The specific information sought in the search warrant concerning the sale
of the stolen mot

Deja una respuesta

Tu dirección de correo electrónico no será publicada.