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24JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1999–2000President Dwight Eisenhower outlined hisproposal for defense reorganization in1958. Concerned about unity of com-mand at the highest levels, he focused onunified commands, multi-service combatantstructures which divide responsibilities amongtheaters around the world. Based on his experi-ence in directing complex military operations,Eisenhower thought it unrealistic that the UnitedStates could institute a perfect system to addressall its security requirements. However he insistedon a command plan that remained true to thedoctrine of unity, clarifying the authority of com-manders in chief (CINCs) of unified commandsover component commanders and by the Presi-dent and Secretary of Defense over CINCs.For over two decades, from his initial assign-ment in the War Department to his election asPresident, and as CINC of unified and combinedcommands, Chief of Staff of the Army, actingChairman of the Joint Chiefs, or Commander inChief of the Armed Forces, Eisenhower sustaineda consistent approach. “Separate ground, sea, andair warfare is gone forever,” he recorded in his1958 proposal. “If ever again we should be in-volved in war, we will fight it . . . with all services,as one single concentrated effort.”1 Jointness, heargued, was the key to achieving unity.Colonel David Jablonsky, USA (Ret.), is professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Army War College where he has held both the Elihu Root Chair of Strategy and the George C. Marshall Chair of Military Studies.Eisenhowerand the Origins of Unified CommandBy D A V I D J A B L O N S K YNaval Historical CenterWith Arnold, Marshall,and King in France.
J a b l o n s k yAutumn/Winter 1999–2000 / JFQ25The Eisenhower ExperienceThe issue of unity of command over theateroperations had its origins in the interwar yearswhen the Joint Board of the Army and Navy pre-scribed that the fundamental method of interser-vice coordination was mutual cooperation, the onein effect when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.After that disaster, the investigating committeenoted, “The inherent and intolerable weaknessesof command by mutual cooperation were ex-posed.”2As a result, shortly after Colonel Eisen-hower arrived in the War Plans Division at theWar Department in 1941, a general consensus ex-isted on the need for unity in the field. ThusEisenhower soon found himself involved in allaspects of the operations of unified commands.By the end of World War II no senior officeron either side had more unified and combinedcommand experience thanEisenhower. It is easy to for-get today how unique hisbackground was. Before thatconflict no American hadever led a vast unified bodyconsisting of armies, navies,and air forces; and none hadever directed an allied command. While unifiedand combined operations were conducted inother theaters, Eisenhower had the largest andmost complex responsibilities.Between 1945 and 1953 when he assumedthe Presidency, Eisenhower served in a number ofpositions that maintained his focus on unity ofcommand. He garnered experience in far morecomplicated and less malleable jobs than that ofSupreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.During his tenure as the Chief of Staff of the U.S.Army from December 1945 to February 1948, forinstance, he engaged in many political-militaryconflicts as head of a service, an interested partywho despite the prestige of being a chief was onlyone among equals in power. It was a period offrustration. Shortly after assuming this new as-signment, he wrote to his son that the position“was a sorry place to light after having com-manded a theater of war.”3Partway through histenure he observed, “My own method workedwell for me when I was a little czar in my ownsector. I find it difficult to readjust to the de-mands of this city.”4Eisenhower’s unease about his role as a chiefof staff largely derived from seeking unity at alllevels. In the field, despite agreement on the uni-fied system in peacetime, the Army and Navy dis-agreed over various areas in the Pacific. Moreover,Eisenhower expanded the debate by arguing for a global structure to achieve “sound unified command arrangements at the earliest possibletime . . . [in] areas in the world where . . . the situ-ation is at least as acute as in the Pacific.”5In September 1946 he sent a global unifiedcommand plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlin-ing their roles as well as those of unified and com-ponent commanders. By early December, an in-creasingly impatient Eisenhower keep his proposalalive through concessions to make his plan accept-able to the other services. This experience differedfrom those heady wartime days when as a staff of-ficer he singlehandedly wrote the directive oncommand of a major Pacific theater of operations.President Harry Truman approved the firstunified command plan in December 1946. Impor-tantly, it retained Eisenhower’s proposals on therole of commanders in a global unified plan. Uni-fied commands would consist of two or morecomponents, each led by an officer authorized tocommunicate directly with service headquarterson administration, logistics, and training matters.Such commands would operate with joint staffs.Finally, the Joint Chiefs would exercise strategicdirection as they had in time of war, assigningforces and stipulating missions. They would alsofollow the practice of designating one chief as ex-ecutive agent to oversee operations conducted byunified commands. All in all, the first plan was atremendous accomplishment for Eisenhower andthe result of conciliation, compromise, and anability to overcome service parochialism.6The debate over this plan reflected a ques-tion of defense unification that had been fester-ing since early in World War II. Eisenhower’s suc-cess made a compelling argument for unificationat the highest levels with clear and accountableauthority down to the unified commanders inthe field. “I am convinced,” he told Congress inNovember 1945, ”that unless we have unity ofdirection in Washington through the years ofpeace that be ahead, we may enter another emer-gency, in a time to come, as we did in Pearl Har-bor.” He favored the proposal to unify the serv-ices under a single, cabinet-level head, aSecretary of National Defense and single Chief ofStaff of the Armed Forces. The Navy, on the otherhand, proposed maintaining a committee systemto adjust activities of the services and integratemilitary policies with overall domestic and inter-national requirements.Both services outlined their proposals beforethe Senate in October 1945. The War Departmentplan as presented by General J. Lawton Collinswas confusing, particularly the dual relationshipof service chiefs as the hierarchical subordinatesto the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces butno senior officer on either side had more unified and combined command experience than EisenhowerNaval Historical Center
E I S E N H O W E R A N D U N I F I E D C O M M A N D26JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1999–2000equal to him as members of an advisory JCS. Inaddition, the command line on the chart whichCollins drew showed theater commanders di-rectly under the Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces, implying that he alone would direct oper-ations conducted by CINCs. Collins took greatpains to emphasize that a single chief of staffwould not have a large staff and that servicechiefs would be executive agents for the JointChiefs to carry out their directives with opera-tional staffs of their own services. But before thesame committee in the Senate some two weekslater, Eisenhower was drawn to the solid com-mand line on the organizational chart. The Chiefof Staff of the Armed Forces, he said, should beremoved from the chain running from the Secre-tary to both the service chiefs and theater com-manders and depicted in the advisory JCS organi-zational box as the main adviser to the civilianhead. He was sure that was the original intent be-cause, as he told the Senate Committee on Mili-tary Affairs, “by drawing him as he appears onthe chart, it looks like he is the fabulous man onhorseback that we are always talking about.”On December 19, 1945 President Truman de-livered a unification message to Congress thatclearly favored the single department proposed inthe Collins Plan. Nevertheless,Secretary of the Navy JamesForrestal was optimistic as thenew year began because thenew Army Chief of Staff andhis counterpart, AdmiralChester Nimitz, had alreadybegun negotiations that ap-peared likely to settle what the Secretary calledthe unification lawsuit. “Eisenhower is a goodpractical Dutchman and so is Nimitz,” Forrestalnoted, “and between them I believe we will makeprogress.”7Another year would pass, however, be-fore both chiefs and service secretaries arrived at adraft proposal for unification, and even thenpresidential action was needed on several in-tractable points. Eisenhower was committedthroughout the process to overall unity of com-mand under a civilian secretary. The compromiseproposal emerged from Congress on July 26, 1947as the National Security Act, which created a co-ordinated defense establishment not unlike thatin the Navy model, an organization which Eisen-hower characterized as “little more than a weakconfederation of sovereign military units.”8Thecompromise was notable for the powers providedto the Secretary of Defense, who instead of pre-siding over a single executive branch departmentwas to head a National Military Establishmentconsisting of three executive departments, onefor each service, under cabinet level secretaries.The services, which now included the Air Force,retained their essential autonomy as well as rolesand missions that had emerged from the war. Im-portantly, the act made JCS a permanent organi-zation served by a joint staff (limited to 100 offi-cers) with equal numbers from each militarydepartment. The Joint Chiefs were given statu-tory authorization to continue their wartime rolesto act as the principal military advisers to boththe President and Secretary, prepare strategicplans and provide for the strategic direction ofthe Armed Forces, and “establish unified com-mands in strategic areas when such unified com-mands are in the interest of national security.”Despite his support for a compromise, Eisen-hower had reservations over the new national se-curity blueprint. The idea that JCS would con-tinue as a collaborative coordinated bodybothered him. As he told a congressional com-mittee, “There is weakness in any council run-ning a war. . . . In war you must have a decision.”The point with committees was that “when youget three, you finally get none.” One solution wasa single chief of staff, a preference that he admit-ted might be too disruptive.Meanwhile, Eisenhower argued for joint cul-ture. “When you have kept services apart and youwait until men are fifty before they begin to meetand know much about each other, it is pretty dif-ficult to develop the kind of team play that ap-plies on one of the Knute Rockne football teams.”A year later, Eisenhower returned to the theme ina farewell memorandum to Secretary Forrestal.“Someday it will be possible to give to selected of-ficers of the several services ‘combined arms’commissions that will transcend in prestige andin public regard anything they could hold ofcomparable rank in one of the individual serv-ices.” The memo was also a reminder of the needfor an evolutionary approach to the National Se-curity Act. “There should be no hesitancy inusing the ‘trial and error’ method so long as theseproceed from minor innovation toward largerand more radical objectives in final result.”9Forrestal later asked Eisenhower to serve ashis adviser and informal JCS Chairman. FromDecember 1948 to July 1949, Eisenhower wasPresident of Columbia University and Chairmanduring increasingly tense sessions with thechiefs. As he later recalled, “I was an umpire be-tween disputing services; sometimes a hatchetman on what Fox Conner used to call foolschemes.”10Forrestal’s aim was to use Eisen-hower as a senior military adviser interactingwith JCS to obtain an amendment to the Na-tional Security Act to provide for a permanentChairman. “With Ike here for sixty days,” heForrestal asked Eisenhowerto serve as informal JCSChairman during tense sessions with the chiefs
J a b l o n s k yAutumn/Winter 1999–2000 / JFQ27wrote in his diary, “I think we can get the pat-tern set and prove its workability by pragmaticexperience.”11But at first Eisenhower favoredmajority rule, whereby if the chiefs failed threetimes to reach unanimity the majority viewwould prevail. But after adjudicating bitter dis-putes, he changed his mind. “The JCS need aChairman at the very least—and by that I meana fourth member who can divorce himself fromhis service background.”12By that time, Eisenhower was heavily in-volved in all aspects of the proposed changes tothe law. The Chairman, he suggested, should takeprecedence over all others but be a nonvotingmember to “allay suspicions that the man wasgoing to be an arbitrary boss.”13Nor should therebe any fixed ceiling on the size of the Joint Staff.On August 10, Truman signed the NationalSecurity Amendments of 1949, transforming theNational Military Establishment into the Depart-ment of Defense. These amendments, reflectingcongressional modifications, remained basicallyconcerned with two issues for which Eisenhowerhad provided input: increases in the formal au-thority of the Secretary and the scope of the au-thority of the Chairman. With regard to the Secre-tary, the qualifying term general was removed fromthe description of his “direction, authority, andcontrol.” Equally important, the service secretarieslost significant power with their removal from theNational Security Council and loss of cabinet sta-tus, although they retained the statutory obliga-tion to separately administer military departments.As for the recommendation that the Chair-man head JCS and act as principal adviser to thePresident and Secretary, Congress agreed that hewould preside as a nonvoting member. But theJoint Chiefs and not the Chairman would be theprincipal advisers and as such would be sup-ported by a Joint Staff with a strength of 210. Inaddition, although the service secretaries and mil-itary chiefs would no longer deal directly withthe President or budget director as Eisenhowerrecommended, they could, after informing theSecretary, take to Congress “any recommenda-tions relating to the Department of Defense.”Finally, the law prohibited the major combatfunctions of military departments from beingtransferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated,a provision that reflected continued sensitivity toservice roles and missions, a point deliberately notaddressed in detail in 1947. This matter had osten-sibly been settled by the so-called Key West Agree-ment negotiated by Forrestal and the chiefs inApril 1948, two months after Eisenhower had leftas Army Chief of Staff. In fact, the accord reflectedgrowing tension between service component com-manders and unified commanders. The over-whelming interest of the chiefs at that conferencewas protecting service integrity in operationalcommands involving more than one service.Moreover, the agreement perpetuated the practiceof designating one JCS member as executive agentfor each unified command.Compounding the Key West Agreement, theamendments not only forbade the Secretary to in-terfere with the combat functions of the forcesbeing assigned to unified commands but in-creased the power of the chiefs as it diminishedthat of the service secretaries. The chiefs re-mained individually responsible to their secre-taries. Collectively the Joint Chiefs were the prin-cipal military advisers of the Secretary of Defense;and because they were the only service depart-mental representatives given a statutory role inthe departmental policy process, they became thespokesmen for their services as they had beenduring World War II.Accepting unconditional surrender—May 7, 1945.Naval Historical Center
E I S E N H O W E R A N D U N I F I E D C O M M A N D28JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1999–2000Eisenhower saw further evidence of thetrend to entrench the power of the chiefs as thefirst Supreme Allied Commander Europe in 1951.Much of his frustration focused on the JointChiefs, who complicated efforts to build a uni-fied structure through rivalry with NATO, refus-ing to share intelligence, withholding informa-tion on atomic weapons, and resisting thetransfer of operational control of American unitsto the Alliance. The PresidencyEisenhower’s concern over unity of com-mand virtually assured that defense reorganiza-tion would be an immediate priority when he be-came President in January 1953. It was still aquestion of organizational evolution, as he be-lieved since agreeing to the 1947 compromise.Lessons had been learned through six years oftrial by experience. Still Eisenhower had concernsabout the lack of full centralized civilian control.Even as the status of the secretaries had declinedin the wake of the 1949 act, during the KoreanWar JCS had returned to its dominant position ofWorld War II, running combat operations anddealing directly with the President over U.N. di-rectives. The new President believed he must re-duce the role and political power of JCS, whichhad already begun to deadlock on reduced budg-etary allocations as the Korean War ended.In February 1953, the President establishedthe Rockefeller Committee to develop specificrecommendations on DOD reorganization. Its re-port continued the general tenor of Eisenhower’scriticism, concluding that for the Joint Chiefs “torise above the particular views of their respectiveservices,” they must be removed from commandchannels and serve only as a planning and advi-sory staff. But this solution posed a dilemma.Some believed that the only way the Joint Chiefswould transcend parochial interests was to endtheir service relationships and recommended ahierarchical general staff model that would termi-nate a dual hat role. Acting solely in a staff capac-ity for the Secretary, the chiefs would turn natu-rally to offering national advice. Others opposeda complete separation between operational andplanning responsibilities. One compromise wasstrengthening the Chairman by reorienting thechiefs and their subordinate structures, whichstressed a staff role for the Secretary and deem-phasized the role of the chiefs as service represen-tatives—but did not end it.Eisenhower incorporated this compromise ina message forwarding his reorganization plan. JCScould not effectively plan joint matters while ful-filling responsibilities to service secretaries for ef-ficiency and readiness. One way to further strate-gic planning and advice by overworked chiefs wasto make the Chairman solely responsible formanaging the Joint Staff. Moreover, assignmentof officers to that staff should be subject to ap-proval by the Chairman.Eisenhower also wanted to clarify civilian au-thority. He told Congress that could be done with-out legislative changes, but rather by altering thatpart of the Key West Agreement involving execu-tive agency over the unified commands. This prac-tice had led to “considerable confusion and mis-understanding” over the relationship between JCSand the Secretary of Defense and between theservice chiefs and their secretaries. As a result heintended to direct the Secretary to revise the KeyWest Agreement and designate a military depart-ment as executive agent for each command. “Thechannel of responsibility and authority to a com-mander . . . will unmistakably be from the Presi-dent to the Secretary of Defense to the designatedcivilian secretary of a military department.” In Oc-tober 1953 the Secretary issued an executive orderthat revised the arrangement in accordance withthe President’s message to Congress.However, organizational tension continuedinto Eisenhower’s second term, fueled by risingcosts coupled with fixed budgets. Moreover, theSoviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957 led topublic debate over defense and alarming predic-tions by independent studies. The Presidentformed several advisory groups on the subject, pri-marily to reinforce his ideas on unity of command.He also gave DOD reorganization a top priority inhis State of the Union address on January 9, 1958.Eisenhower believed that much remained tobe done. War could no longer be waged underseparate service efforts. But in the 1947 reorgani-zation, “the lessons were lost, tradition won.” In1949 and 1953 the reforms led to increased cen-tralization and authority on the part of the Secre-tary of Defense—necessary given the new technol-ogy and the Cold War requirements for readinessand deterrence. The process was slowed, however,by predictions of service unification and threats toinstitutions by a military leader serving as theprincipal military adviser to the civilian leader.The theme of Eisenhower’s next round ofproposals was that unity of command must runfrom the highest level to theater commands.“The need for greater unity today is most acute attwo points—in the Office of the Secretary of De-fense and in the major operational commands re-sponsible for actual combat. . . . ” In terms of theEisenhower specifically addressed deficiencies ofunified commands that limited the authority overcomponent commands
J a b l o n s k yAutumn/Winter 1999–2000 / JFQ29operational level, he specifically addressed the de-ficiencies of unified commands that limited theauthority of CINCs over component commands,their influence on resources, and their ability topromote greater unity of effort in their com-mands. The solution was to build on the WorldWar II experience and organize forces into trulyunified commands as the cutting edge of the en-tire defense organization.The key to reform in the field was to clarifycommand lines from the President to CINCs toavoid confusion of authority and diffusion of re-sponsibility. The existing chain of commandfrom the 1953 reorganization had expanded fromthe service secretaries to the point that “ulti-mately the chief of an individual service issues inthe name of the Secretary of Defense, orders to aunified commander.” That the staff was takingover line responsibilities was self-evident becausethe role of JCS should be furnishing professionaladvice and staff assistance to the Secretary. To-ward this end, he directed the Secretary to dis-continue the use of military departments as exec-utive agents for unified commands. “I considerthis chain of command cumbersome and unreli-able in time of peace and not usable in time ofwar. . . . Clearly, secretaries of military depart-ments and chiefs of individual services should beremoved from the command channel.”The result was an operational chain “run-ning from the Commander in Chief and Secretaryof Defense directly to unified commands.” At thesame time, Eisenhower planned to maintain thesupport channel to CINCs through the militarydepartments which, once relieved of responsibil-ity for operations, could focus on administration,training, and logistics of service forces assigned tounified commands.Eisenhower recognized that his proposalswould require JCS to change. For that body to helpthe Secretary direct the unified commands, heasked Congress to raise or remove the statutorylimit of 210 officers on the Joint Staff and author-ize the Chairman to assign duties to that staff andappoint its director. He also proposed that the lawDiscussing Indochinawith General Ely andAdmiral Radford, 1954.Naval Historical Center
E I S E N H O W E R A N D U N I F I E D C O M M A N D30JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1999–2000should emphasize that chiefs were authorized todelegate service responsibilities to their vice chiefs,making their JCS role a primary duty. Finally, thePresident wanted to replace the Joint Staff commit-tee with a new system, creating an integrated oper-ations division with joint directorates that made iteasier for the Joint Staff (as it assumed the dutiesperformed by service staffs) to work with similarstructures in unified commands.Hearings on Capitol Hill on modifying thelegislation lasted from May to July. Eisenhowermet with key leaders and contacted influentialpersons to marshal support in Congress. The re-sult was a compromise bill that favored the ad-ministration position. It granted the President’srequest for authority concerning service combat-ant functions but also provided Congress 70 daysto reject any transfer or abolition of such func-tions by simple majority. Eisenhower consideredthe latter provision “a small hole in the dough-nut” because he was authorized to transfer majorcombatant functions without consulting Con-gress in an emergency.There was a similar compromise with the au-thorization of the Chairman to vote in JCS andmanage the Joint Staff. He was authorized to se-lect that staff (but only in consultation with JCS)and manage it (but only on behalf of the corpo-rate body). Moreover, the chiefs retained the rightto assign duties to the Joint Staff. And there wasno way for the President to ignore what he called“legalized insubordination” in the law which au-thorized service secretaries and chiefs to go di-rectly to Congress with recommendations “theymight deem proper.” Still, Eisenhower consoledhimself with President Grant’s reaction to similarcircumstances: “I cannot make the comptrollergeneral change his mind, but I can get a newcomptroller general.”14Balanced against such compromises were theauthorization for the Chairman to vote in JCS de-liberations, for chiefs to delegate responsibilitiesto vice chiefs, and for the Joint Staff to expand to400 officers. Moreover, in terms of the militarydepartments, the term separately administered wasreplaced with the specification that each wouldbe separately organized under its secretary with allservices functioning under the “direction, author-ity, and control of the Secretary of Defense.”More important for Eisenhower, the law passed in1958 authorized him, acting through the Secre-tary of Defense and with the advice of JCS, to es-tablish unified commands, assign their missions,With Admiral Burkeaboard USS Saratoga,1957.Naval Historical Center
J a b l o n s k yAutumn/Winter 1999–2000 / JFQ31and determine their force structure. In turn,CINCs were responsible to the President and Sec-retary for implementing assigned missions. Ac-cordingly, the law gave CINCs full operationalcommand over assigned forces that could only betransferred with presidential approval. At thesame time, the respective departments retainedresponsibility for the administration, training,and support of those component forces. Finally,under a separate executive action, the Secretarydiscontinued the practice of executive agents forunified commands. Henceforth the chain of com-mand would run from the President through theSecretary of Defense to CINCs.When he signed the Defense ReorganizationAct on August 6, 1958, Eisenhower’s positive reac-tion was understandable because it represented amajor shift from the idea of coordination that tri-umphed in 1947 toward his vision of centralizedcivilian authority. That authority extended toCINCs in a direct operational line on one handand in an administrative and support linethrough the military departments on the other.In theory, both lines were brought together forthe Secretary within the JCS advisory system. TheChairman would lead the effort, thus approach-ing the status of the Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces outlined years earlier by Eisenhower in hisinterpretation of the Collins Plan. The chiefswould offer expertise on service capabilities to thejoint arena while emerging from JCS delibera-tions with much broader perspectives on nationaldefense in order to discharge their responsibili-ties. Moreover, the law granted sweeping author-ity to CINCs.These changes, however, were deceptive. Themilitary departments and services exercised resid-ual de facto power out of proportion to their newstatutory duties. The Office of the Secretary of De-fense was still not organized for full integration ofservice capabilities into the forces required for themissions of unified commands. Nor could theJoint Chiefs, the principal staff contact for CINCs,make meaningful programmatic inputs. As a re-sult, commanders planned missions with assetsprovided by the services through a process de-fended by the same services. That left unifiedcommanders with limited influence over assignedforces, leaving the services and thus componentswith primary control over the structure and readi-ness of forces for which CINCs were responsible.The strength and independence of compo-nent commands would in many ways ensure thatthe executive agent role would persist. These prob-lems continued until passage of the GoldwaterNichols Act, a development that Eisenhowerwould have understood after his 17-year involve-ment with unity of command on the national andtheater levels. At the signing of the reorganizationact in August 1958, he stated that “the law wasjust another step toward what the majority of ex-perienced military men knew was necessary.”15JFQN O T E S1Alice C. Cole et al., editors, The Department of De-fense: Documents on Establishment and Organization,1944–1978 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense,Historical Office, 1978), p. 175.2U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investiga-tion of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Report to Congress(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), p.245.3Louis Galambos, editor, The Papers of DwightDavid Eisenhower, Chief of Staff (Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1970), vol. 7, no. 552, p. 637.4Ibid., vol. 8, no. 1465, p. 1683.5Ibid., no. 1108, p. 1297. See also no. 1074, p.1258.6Ibid., p. 1299; Ronald H. Cole et al., The History ofthe Unified Command Plan, 1946–1993 (Washington:Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, 1995), p. 13.7Jeffery M. Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal: A Na-tional Security Partnership, 1909–1949 (College Station:Texas A&M University Press, 1991), p. 131.8Cole et al., Documents, p. 177.9Galambos, Papers, vol. 9, no. 2055, p. 2243. Seealso Dwight D. Eisenhower, Final Report of the Chief ofStaff United States Army (Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1948), p. 20.10Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell toFriends (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 352.11Walter Millis, editor, The Forrestal Diaries (NewYork: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 540.12Galambos, Papers, vol 10, no. 313, note 5, p. 399.13Ibid., no. 327, p. 433 and no. 288, p. 358.14Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years,Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,1965), p. 251.15Cole et al, Documents, p. 253.Naval Historical Center
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